NASA has provided the SECURE Center with the following information for grantees: 

NASA grant and cooperative agreement recipients are reminded that NASA is restricted by law from using appropriated funds to engage in bilateral participation, collaboration, or coordination with China or Chinese-owned companies. This restriction applies to all activities conducted under NASA awards.

When submitting grant proposals, applicants’ Authorized Organizational Representatives sign an attestation affirming that the applicant will not engage in such restricted activities, at the prime recipient level or at any subrecipient level. Additionally, the NASA Grant and Cooperative Agreement Manual (GCAM, effective March 21, 2025) - which governs all NASA grants and cooperative agreements - contains explicit language regarding this restriction. See GCAM Section 9.4, Proposals Involving Non-U.S. Organizations, and Appendix A, Certifications, Assurances, and Representations, for specific language.

\The statutory basis for this restriction is found in NASA’s annual appropriations legislation. The most recent language is in Section 526 of the Commerce, Justice, Science; Energy and Water Development; and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 119-74), and it states that neither NASA nor the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) may use appropriated funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company […].”

What this means for your institution:

• Do not engage in bilateral coordination, collaboration, or participation with China or any Chinese-owned companies or Chinese universities, including individuals working for such entities, under your NASA award. This restriction includes direct sharing of NASA-funded research data through any means, including IT systems, as well as bilateral joint publications with authors affiliated with the Chinese government or Chinese companies or universities.

• Ensure all project activities comply with the terms and conditions of your award and the GCAM.

Do not engage in bilateral coordination, collaboration, or participation with China or any Chinese-owned companies or Chinese universities, including individuals working for such entities, under your NASA award. This restriction includes direct sharing of NASA-funded research data through any means, including IT systems, as well as bilateral joint publications with authors affiliated with the Chinese government or Chinese companies or universities.

Ensure all project activities comply with the terms and conditions of your award and the GCAM.

Failure to comply may result in remedies for noncompliance, including award termination, disallowed costs, or referrals for consideration of suspension or debarment proceedings.

For questions regarding NASA grants, please contact your NASA Grant Officer. This information is not legal advice. You should consult your own legal counsel regarding questions of compliance with the terms of your grant.

At a press event on February 11, 2026, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a joint USDA and Department of War (DoW) effort to strengthen interagency collaboration on implementation of the National Farm Security Action Plan which includes strengthening research security. Among the noted actions are terminating contractors and visiting scientists who have citizenship from countries of concern and developing standard terms and conditions across all USDA grant and cooperative agreement programs.
 

The February 11 press release, the first action taken under this joint effort, is the launch of a partnership between the DoW Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and USDA’s Office of the Chief Scientist to "share information regarding security vulnerabilities in agriculture, partner to develop novel technological solutions to challenges facing American agriculture, and exchange personnel to accelerate innovation and protect the agricultural supply chain.”
 

The press release highlights the creation of the Office of Research, Economic, and Science Security (ORESS) within the agency’s Office of the Chief Scientist.  Per USDA the role of the new office is to protect the Department’s interests by “…securing research and technology to be free from malign and undue foreign influence….”  To accomplish this goal, ORESS’ responsibilities include leading and coordinating policies and training resources to:
 

• Prevent unwanted technology transfer

• Appropriately protect and leverage data and intellectual property

• Inform domestic and international collaborations
   

Prevent unwanted technology transfer

Appropriately protect and leverage data and intellectual property

Inform domestic and international collaborations
 

USDA funding recipients with questions related to research security are encouraged to email ORESS at researchsecurity@usda.gov.

The U.S. Department of Education (DoED) announced the release of updated foreign funding disclosures submitted by federally funded colleges and universities under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act as part of a broader federal effort to increase transparency.  Per DoED, the Section 117 data include more than 8,300 contracts and gifts from foreign sources, totaling over $5.2 billion in 2025. The press release contains a link to a new Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Public Transparency Dashboard.  The Dashboard includes a section for “Total Value of Transactions involving Counterparties of Concern by US Government List” providing data on funding reported by institutions with entities appearing on various U.S. government restricted lists (e.g., BIS Entity List, DoD 1286 List, OFAC Sanctions List). It is common practice among institutions of higher education to screen entities (e.g., donors, sponsors of research and other contracts) against U.S. restrictions. Since foreign entities are placed on these lists at various points in time, clarity will be sought on whether the Dashboard accounts for the point in time a university reported a contract or gift with the entity relative to the time that the entity was added to a U.S. government list.
 

Related reporting from Axios provides additional context, noting that the funding is highly concentrated and often reflects legitimate academic activity rather than covert influence. According to the Axios article, more than half of the reported funding went to just four universities, and major sources included countries such as Qatar, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. Experts interviewed expressed caution that Section 117 data can be difficult to interpret because it aggregates diverse transactions (including scholarships, tuition payments, and overseas campus operations) and may not accurately reflect the true origin or intent of funds, according to Axios.

In a February 19, 2026 press release, House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley announced letters to NASA and the FBI raising questions about taxpayer-funded research collaborations potentially linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
 

The Chairs’s letter to NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman cites cases included in their committees’ previous report on Department of Energy-funded research involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in which U.S. researchers allegedly maintained ties to Chinese institutions while working on federally funded projects, raising compliance concerns related to the “Wolf Amendment,” which limits NASA’s bilateral cooperation with the PRC. Their letter requests that NASA detail its policies and processes for monitoring such collaborations and enforcing compliance with the Wolf Amendment, and provide award and subaward data for all the agency’s research funding for fiscal years 2015-2026.  In Moolenaar and Grassley’s corresponding letter to FBI Director Kash Patel, they request that the Bureau provide information on Wolf Amendment waiver requests since 2015, investigations, and inter-agency coordination related to potential violations.

A February 12, 2026, article in the Boulder Reporting Lab refers to development of a proposed update to decision-making criteria for safeguarding U.S. science at NIST.  Per NIST representatives, the update has not been finalized.  The criteria under development are intended to ensure that NIST’s foreign national associate program is supporting NIST’s mission needs, adding value to the organization and minimizing risk to the nation.  They align with Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported and Development National Security Policy and NIST’s Safeguarding International Science: A Research Security Framework, first published in 2023.  The intent of NIST’s foreign national associate program is for short-term collaborations in alignment with the NIST mission.

In this opinion piece, the authors warn that escalating geopolitical tensions and increasingly stringent research-security policies are driving a dangerous “decoupling” of global science, particularly between the United States and China. The article argues that export controls, data restrictions, visa barriers, and limits on collaboration are creating a fragmented, two-track research system with separate standards, infrastructure, supply chains, and talent flows. The authors suggest this fragmentation could slow innovation, duplicate efforts, and hinder the global exchange of data and expertise needed to address global challenges such as pandemics, climate change, and food security. The authors caution that growing mistrust, surveillance concerns, and political sensitivities are discouraging international mobility and collaboration, potentially undermining the culture of openness that has historically driven scientific progress and, instead, call for balanced, transparent governance approaches that mitigate security risks without isolating research communities or weakening the global knowledge ecosystem. (more)

This opinion essay argues that recent reports suggesting Chinese universities are overtaking American institutions in global rankings can be misleading because many rankings heavily emphasize research volume and citation counts rather than educational quality, academic freedom, or broader societal impact.  The author contends that while China has made substantial investments that have boosted research output, U.S. universities retain key advantages not fully captured by quantitative metrics, including openness, intellectual diversity, and the ability to attract global talent.  The piece cautions policymakers and the public against interpreting ranking shifts as evidence of inevitable U.S. decline, emphasizing that how “excellence” is defined and measured matter as much as the numbers. (more)

British intelligence agency MI5 has warned university leaders that Chinese state actors and other “hostile states” are increasingly attempting to intimidate academics, influence research, and suppress discussion of politically sensitive topics. At a rare security briefing attended by dozens of vice-chancellors, officials described tactics including threatening phone calls, financial inducements, covert partnerships, legal pressure, and online approaches designed to steer teaching and research away from issues such as Tiananmen Square, Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan. Universities were urged to strengthen safeguards, report suspicious activity, and seek cyber-security support. The government is also developing new reporting mechanisms and advisory services to help institutions counter foreign interference while protecting academic freedom. (more)

Registration is open for COGR’s virtual membership meeting, taking place February 24-27, 2026, and the preliminary agenda has been posted. Research security-related topics include:
 

• Wednesday, 2/25/26, 12:00pm – 1:00pm EST: Complying with DOJ’s Bulk Sensitive Data Rule

• Thursday, 2/26/26, 4:00pm – 5:00pm EST: Unboxing Gifts, Monetary Donations, and Common Form Other Support

• Friday, 2/27/26, 12:00pm – 1:30pm EST: Forthcoming Federal Research Security Program Requirements and FDP Cybersecurity Guidelines Demonstration

Wednesday, 2/25/26, 12:00pm – 1:00pm EST: Complying with DOJ’s Bulk Sensitive Data Rule

Thursday, 2/26/26, 4:00pm – 5:00pm EST: Unboxing Gifts, Monetary Donations, and Common Form Other Support

Friday, 2/27/26, 12:00pm – 1:30pm EST: Forthcoming Federal Research Security Program Requirements and FDP Cybersecurity Guidelines Demonstration

Texas A&M University’s Research and Innovation Security and Competitiveness (RISC) Institute disseminates weekly RISC Media Bulletins, covering topics related to research security, foreign influence, and the intersection of science, technology, and national security.  To join the distribution list for the RISC Bulletin or view previous editions, access this link for more info.

Registration is open (including virtual attendance) for the 2026 Academic Security and Counter Exploitation (ASCE) Program, marking the10th anniversary of the largest research security conference in the world: February 24 - 26, 2026. (more)

A recording is now available of the February 17, 2026, NSF SECURE Center webinar, “Research Security 101: From ‘Foreign Influence’ to the CHIPS and Science Act.” The session, led by Lori Schultz, Co-Director of the NSF SECURE Center Southwest Region and Assistant Vice President for Research Administration at Colorado State University, covered foreign influence/research security in the context of higher education institutions, from universities first learning about the issue through today, including the DOJ China Initiative, NSPM-33 and the definition of research security programs, and the CHIPS and Science Act.

Due to the coinciding ASCE and COGR meetings occurring the week of 2/23/2026, there will not be an NSF SECURE Center Research Security Briefing released later in the week.  The standard end-of-week schedule will resume with next week’s issue, which will include highlights from both the ASCE and COGR events.

Each week the NSF SECURE Center hosts events through the National and Regional Centers, including co-creation workshops, educational, and engagement sessions with the research community. The events calendar provides more information about these opportunities and more.