On March 25, 2026, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) announced the publication of the agency’s revised Grants Policy Statement (NIHGPS) for fiscal year 2026.  As noted in NIH’s corresponding Summary of Significant Changes document, a number of revisions touch on research security:

• Updates throughout the NIHGPS reflect that, per NOT-OD-25-104, NIH no longer recognizes foreign subawards.

• The definition of “Other Support” in section 1.2 has been updated to include the statement “Monetary donations given to institutions or directly to senior/key personnel that support research activities related to an individual are given with an expectation and therefore, such donations must be reported as other support.”

• The term “U.S. Person” has been added to section 1.2, “As defined under 28 CFR § 202.256, any United States citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident; any individual admitted to the United States as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 1157 or granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158; any entity organized solely under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches); or any person in the United States.”

• In alignment with NOT-OD-25-133, language in section 2.5.1 (Just-In-Time Procedures) has been updated to specify that “NIH requires recipients to establish and maintain effective internal controls (e.g. policies, trainings [emphasis added], and procedures) to ensure that individuals designated in applications as senior/key personnel fully disclose all Other Support information….”

• A new section, 8.4.1.8 - Research Securities, has been inserted, stating that “In alignment with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-167) and National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33), NIH has established a series of requirements to strengthen research security across NIH-funded projects.”

• A new section, 8.4.1.10 – Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program, has been inserted, stating that “In accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-167) , individuals who are a current party to a Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program (MFTRP) are not eligible to serve as a senior/key person on an NIH grant or cooperative agreement.”Note that NIH’s “Summary of Significant Changes” document refers to this addition as “section 8.4.1.8.2.”

• A new section, 8.4.1.11 – Research Security Training, has been inserted that notes the requirements, as outlined in NOT-OD-26-017 for senior/key personnel and authorized organizational representatives (AORs) to complete research security training certifications.  Note that NIH’s “Summary of Significant Changes” document refers to this addition as “section 8.4.1.8.3.”

• A new section, 16.8 – Collaborative International Research Awards, has been added that reflects NIH’s revised structure that funds international subproject components as direct foreign awards, as described in NOT-OD-25-155.

• Section 16.3 – Application Review, has been revised to state that “Applications from foreign organizations or international organizations will be evaluated and scored during the initial review process using the appropriate peer review framework for the activity code” rather than being reviewed “using the standard review criteria,” per NOT-OD-24-107 and NOT-OD-25-155.

Updates throughout the NIHGPS reflect that, per NOT-OD-25-104, NIH no longer recognizes foreign subawards.

The definition of “Other Support” in section 1.2 has been updated to include the statement “Monetary donations given to institutions or directly to senior/key personnel that support research activities related to an individual are given with an expectation and therefore, such donations must be reported as other support.”

The term “U.S. Person” has been added to section 1.2, “As defined under 28 CFR § 202.256, any United States citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident; any individual admitted to the United States as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 1157 or granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158; any entity organized solely under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches); or any person in the United States.”

In alignment with NOT-OD-25-133, language in section 2.5.1 (Just-In-Time Procedures) has been updated to specify that “NIH requires recipients to establish and maintain effective internal controls (e.g. policies, trainings [emphasis added], and procedures) to ensure that individuals designated in applications as senior/key personnel fully disclose all Other Support information….”

A new section, 8.4.1.8 - Research Securities, has been inserted, stating that “In alignment with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-167) and National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33), NIH has established a series of requirements to strengthen research security across NIH-funded projects.”

A new section, 8.4.1.10 – Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program, has been inserted, stating that “In accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-167) , individuals who are a current party to a Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program (MFTRP) are not eligible to serve as a senior/key person on an NIH grant or cooperative agreement.”Note that NIH’s “Summary of Significant Changes” document refers to this addition as “section 8.4.1.8.2.”

A new section, 8.4.1.11 – Research Security Training, has been inserted that notes the requirements, as outlined in NOT-OD-26-017 for senior/key personnel and authorized organizational representatives (AORs) to complete research security training certifications.  Note that NIH’s “Summary of Significant Changes” document refers to this addition as “section 8.4.1.8.3.”

A new section, 16.8 – Collaborative International Research Awards, has been added that reflects NIH’s revised structure that funds international subproject components as direct foreign awards, as described in NOT-OD-25-155.

Section 16.3 – Application Review, has been revised to state that “Applications from foreign organizations or international organizations will be evaluated and scored during the initial review process using the appropriate peer review framework for the activity code” rather than being reviewed “using the standard review criteria,” per NOT-OD-24-107 and NOT-OD-25-155.

In addition, three new sections outline significant research security-related requirements for SBIR/STTR awardees specifically.  These are:

• 18.5.3.1 – Required Disclosures of Foreign Affiliations or Relationships to Foreign Countries (Note: this section appears as 18.5.4 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

• 18.5.5.6 – Prior Approval of New Subawards (Note: this section appears as 18.5.6.6 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

• 18.5.5.7 – Monitoring Requirements for Relationships with Foreign Countries of Concern Post-Award (Note: this section appears as 18.5.6.7 6 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

18.5.3.1 – Required Disclosures of Foreign Affiliations or Relationships to Foreign Countries (Note: this section appears as 18.5.4 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

18.5.5.6 – Prior Approval of New Subawards (Note: this section appears as 18.5.6.6 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

18.5.5.7 – Monitoring Requirements for Relationships with Foreign Countries of Concern Post-Award (Note: this section appears as 18.5.6.7 6 in the PDF version of the March 2026 NIHGPS)

On March 12, 2026, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held the hearing “Transparency and Trust: Exposing Malign Foreign Influence in Higher Education”  The hearing highlighted bipartisan concern over foreign funding, research partnerships, and talent flows, particularly involving China, while also underscoring divisions over how to respond. Lawmakers and witnesses broadly agreed on the need for greater transparency, including the potential strengthening of Higher Education Act Section 117 reporting requirements, improving data quality, and enhancing interagency information sharing to better assess risks associated with foreign gifts and collaborations.

At the same time, the hearing revealed tension between security measures and the benefits of global scientific engagement. Some witnesses advocated for stricter controls, such as expanded visa screening and more aggressive limits on collaborations with Chinese institutions. Others emphasized that existing safeguards and university cooperation are already improving, noting that policies should be evidence-based and proportionate to demonstrated risks.

A central theme was the challenge of maintaining the United States’ role as a global “talent magnet.” Senators and witnesses raised concerns that overly restrictive policies, declining international student enrollment, and reduced research funding could contribute to a “brain drain” and weaken U.S. competitiveness, particularly as China increases investment in research and higher education. Overall, the hearing underscored the need for a balanced approach: strengthening transparency and targeted risk mitigation while preserving the openness and international collaboration that underpin U.S. scientific leadership.  

The National Science Foundation (NSF) will be holding two webinars highlighting and differentiating the range of research security funding opportunities from multiple NSF directorates appropriate for those involved in research security policy, implementation, administration, and research. All organization types, including those in EPSCoR jurisdictions, are encouraged to attend. The following NSF programs will participate:

• Research on Research Security (RoRS)

• Growing Research Access for Nationally Transformative Economic Development (GRANTED): Dear Colleague Letter: Growing Research Compliance Support and Service Infrastructure for Nationally Transformative Economic Development (GRANTED DCL)

• Law & Science (LS)

• Security and Preparedness (SAP)

• Security, Privacy, and Trust in Cyberspace (SaTC 2.0)

• Science of Science: Discovery, Communication and Impact (SoS:DCI)

• Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI)

Research on Research Security (RoRS)

Growing Research Access for Nationally Transformative Economic Development (GRANTED): Dear Colleague Letter: Growing Research Compliance Support and Service Infrastructure for Nationally Transformative Economic Development (GRANTED DCL)

Law & Science (LS)

Security and Preparedness (SAP)

Security, Privacy, and Trust in Cyberspace (SaTC 2.0)

Science of Science: Discovery, Communication and Impact (SoS:DCI)

Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI)

To learn more, register for either of the webinars below. Both webinars are live, with identical content.

• Thursday, April 2, 2026 at 3-4:30 pm Eastern. Registration link

• Wednesday, April 29, 2026 at 4-5:30pm Eastern. Registration link

Thursday, April 2, 2026 at 3-4:30 pm Eastern. Registration link

Wednesday, April 29, 2026 at 4-5:30pm Eastern. Registration link

In its March 2026 Update, COGR, a higher education association, provided the following analysis of a February 2026 report by the Center for Research Security and Integrity:

A new report from the Center for Research Security & Integrity (CRSI), “Are Research Security Policies in the U.S. Working? A Case Study on Research Collaborations with PRC Defense Laboratories and U.S. Federally Sponsored Research,” seeks to assess whether recent U.S. research security policies have reduced collaboration between U.S. federally funded researchers and laboratories associated with the People’s Republic of China’s defense research ecosystem.

Like the Fox in the Henhouse report issued by the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, and covered in the September 2025 COGR Update, this report relies heavily on bibliometric analysis of co-authored publications involving U.S. federally funded researchers and individuals affiliated with institutions linked to Chinese defense laboratories. Concerns have been raised that (i) co-authored publications alone do not accurately reflect the depth, nature, or even existence of meaningful collaborations, and (ii) due to publication timelines and lag effects, listed institutional affiliations do not necessarily reflect an author’s position at the time the underlying research was conducted, potentially overstating or mischaracterizing connections to entities of concern.

Another important contextual factor is the timeframe of the report’s bibliometric dataset. The study analyzes publications from January 2019 - June 2025, including approximately two years of papers published before the issuance of NSPM-33 in January 2021. Given the typical publication lag, many articles in the dataset likely reflect research conducted prior to the development and implementation of NSPM-33-related policies. As a result, the analysis may not fully capture the impact of federal research security measures that universities and federal agencies have only begun implementing in recent years.

Despite concerns raised about using bibliometric data in this manner, the authors conclude—based on their questionable analysis—that collaborations between U.S. researchers and certain PRC defense-affiliated institutions have continued across several scientific and engineering fields despite the increased focus on research security policies in the United States in recent years.

The authors suggest that existing U.S. policy responses, which largely emphasize disclosure and compliance requirements for researchers and institutions, have been ineffective. The report argues that the research community often lacks sufficient information to assess whether foreign collaborators may have connections to foreign military or defense research systems, complicating institutional efforts to manage potential research security risks.

While the report also emphasizes the need for expanded analytic capabilities to assess international research partnerships, it does not reference the Argus Platform currently being developed by NSF SECURE Analytics to support research security analysis for the federal research enterprise.

The report proposes three recommendations that focus on severely restricting research involving collaborations with entities linked to foreign adversaries and centralizing federal oversight:

• Enactment of the SAFE Research Act. The authors call on Congress to pass the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Research Act), which would prohibit any U.S. scientist from receiving federal funding who has collaborated with anyone “affiliated with a hostile foreign entity” during the previous 5 years. If passed, prohibited activities under the Act would include joint research, co-authorship, and advising graduate students and postdoctoral fellows.

• The Creation of a New Federal Center. The report recommends establishing a government entity to serve as a clearinghouse for government-wide research security and integrity regulations, as well as for compliance monitoring and enforcement.

• U.S. and Allied Nations Coordination. The authors encourage the U.S. and allied nations to support collaborative “research on research security” initiatives and multi-sector consortia to address persistent knowledge gaps.

Enactment of the SAFE Research Act. The authors call on Congress to pass the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Research Act), which would prohibit any U.S. scientist from receiving federal funding who has collaborated with anyone “affiliated with a hostile foreign entity” during the previous 5 years. If passed, prohibited activities under the Act would include joint research, co-authorship, and advising graduate students and postdoctoral fellows.

The Creation of a New Federal Center. The report recommends establishing a government entity to serve as a clearinghouse for government-wide research security and integrity regulations, as well as for compliance monitoring and enforcement.

U.S. and Allied Nations Coordination. The authors encourage the U.S. and allied nations to support collaborative “research on research security” initiatives and multi-sector consortia to address persistent knowledge gaps.

The report contains conflict-of-interest disclosures for two of the authors. One author previously worked on a subcontract related to the development of the Argus platform, although that subcontract is no longer in place. Another author is also a Lead Investigator for the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

(COGR Update, March 20, 2026)

Iowa is the latest state to consider banning H-1B visa holders from public universities. Faculty members of Iowa State University and the University of Iowa spoke to the crowd of approximately 150 at a rally on March 21, 2026, about their experiences as H-1B visa holders and how the bill would affect both universities and the state of Iowa. The implication of the bill is that Iowa State University, University of Iowa, University of Northern Iowa, as well as community colleges, would not be able to hire citizens from countries that are designated as foreign adversaries or state sponsors of terrorism under Iowa House File 2513 . The Iowa House passed the bill on March 3 with a 68-27 vote. An Iowa Senate subcommittee recommends the bill's passage. (more)

This Science policy forum article argues that as governments expand research security efforts in response to rising geopolitical tensions, clearer and more consistent guidance is urgently needed to avoid unintended harm to the scientific enterprise. The authors note that while protecting national interests is important, poorly defined or inconsistently applied policies risk creating confusion, discouraging international collaboration, and placing undue administrative burdens on researchers and institutions. They call for transparent, well-coordinated frameworks that balance security concerns with the need to sustain open, global scientific collaboration, emphasizing that clarity and proportionality are key to ensuring research security measures are effective and not counterproductive. (more)

A former postdoc at MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston who was charged with theft of trade secrets in August 2025 has been sentenced to one year in prison in addition to time served, with subsequent deportation. Li Yunhai, a Chinese citizen, started his postdoctoral appointment in 2022 and conducted research funded by NIH and the Department of Defense. Despite institutional policies and procedures regarding a ban on the storage of data on personal electronic devices, outside financial interests and outside activities, Li engaged in all of these practices, according to court documents. (more)

A recent commentary from the Mercator Institute for China Studies highlights Europe’s growing challenge in balancing research security concerns with the benefits of continued scientific collaboration with China. The authors note that rising geopolitical tensions and fears of technology transfer, particularly in sensitive or high-tech fields, are prompting calls for tighter restrictions, often in the absence of clear or consistent policy frameworks.

At the same time, the piece emphasizes that collaboration with China remains highly valuable for Europe’s scientific output, innovation capacity, and global competitiveness. Rather than adopting broad “decoupling” approaches, the authors argue that Europe should shift toward more nuanced risk management strategies to identify and mitigate specific vulnerabilities while preserving beneficial partnerships.

Overall, the article underscores that Europe’s “research dilemma” lies in avoiding overly blunt restrictions that could undermine scientific progress, while still addressing legitimate national security risks, and calls for clearer guidance, targeted safeguards, and a balanced, strategic approach to international collaboration. (more)

Registration is now open for the in-person May 2026 Federal Demonstration Partnership (FDP) meeting at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC.  The meeting starts on Wednesday, May 27th, and concludes by noon on Friday, May 29th.  Information regarding research security-related sessions will be provided as agenda details become available. 

Registration is now open for the in-person June 2026 Council on Government Relations (COGR) meeting.  Starting at 9am on Thursday, June 11 through Friday afternoon, June 12th, the meeting location is the Washington Marriott at Georgetown. Information regarding research security-related sessions will be provided as agenda details become available

Texas A&M University’s Research and Innovation Security and Competitiveness (RISC) Institute disseminates weekly RISC Media Bulletins, covering topics related to research security, foreign influence, and the intersection of science, technology, and national security.  To join the distribution list for the RISC Bulletin or view previous editions, click here.

In last week’s Research Security Briefing, we reported on the March 9, 2026, U.S. Department of War (DoW) updated matrix, “Component Decision Matrix to Inform Fundamental Research Proposal Mitigation Decisions.”  In follow-up, the SECURE Center, working collaboratively with the research security community, developed a communications template that institutions can adapt and use in email communications to their current DoW senior/key personnel and recent applicants, as well as in newsletters targeting their broader campus research communities. The template can be found here.  The Center appreciates the feedback received from the community and the contributions from Amy Weber of Northwestern University.

Are you a member of the NSF SECURE Center’s Shared Virtual Environment (SVE)?  The NSF SECURE Center website now includes a direct login for the SVE—still using the two-factor security protocol.  Not a member yet?  Request access from the same site.  Within the SVE, members can engage in the Community Forum to connect, ask questions, and work through challenges together, access NSF SECURE Center resources, and more.

The NSF SECURE Center has received valuable feedback that the name of the Risk Assessment Framework doesn’t fully reflect what this product is or how it’s used. We’re inviting the community to help us choose a name that better captures its purpose and value.

We’re testing a few new name options and would love community input through the enclosed LinkedIn poll. Here are the naming options:

• 𝗣𝗥𝗜𝗦𝗠 – 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 & 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘔𝘰𝘥𝘦𝘭

• 𝗔𝗡𝗖𝗛𝗢𝗥 – 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘕𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦, 𝘏𝘢𝘳𝘮, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘖𝘳𝘨𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬

• 𝗦𝗔𝗙𝗘𝗥𝗥 – 𝘚𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘍𝘰𝘳𝘦𝘪𝘨𝘯 𝘌𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 & 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬

• 𝗙𝗥𝗔𝗠𝗘 – 𝘍𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘔𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘴𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯

𝗣𝗥𝗜𝗦𝗠 – 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 & 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘔𝘰𝘥𝘦𝘭

𝗔𝗡𝗖𝗛𝗢𝗥 – 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘕𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦, 𝘏𝘢𝘳𝘮, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘖𝘳𝘨𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘻𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬

𝗦𝗔𝗙𝗘𝗥𝗥 – 𝘚𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘍𝘰𝘳𝘦𝘪𝘨𝘯 𝘌𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 & 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬

𝗙𝗥𝗔𝗠𝗘 – 𝘍𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘙𝘪𝘴𝘬 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘔𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘴𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯

Explore the product here and then cast your vote!

Each week, the NSF SECURE Center hosts events through the National and Regional Centers, including co-creation workshops, educational, and engagement sessions with the research community. The events calendar provides more information about these opportunities and more.